Matching Public Support for Private Product-Innovating R&D: A Theoretical Analysis by Buryi, Pavlo & Lahiri, Sajal
September 1, 2015
Matching Public Support for Private Product-Innovating R&D:
A Theoretical Analysis
by
Pavlo Buryi § and Sajal Lahiri ‡
Abstract
This paper develops a theoretical model of product innovation where R&D effort by a
monopolist firm is endogenous and its outcome uncertain. The government attempts to aid
such efforts with a matching grant. We consider different scenarios depending on whether
two parties act simultaneously, act sequentially, or take part in a dynamic cooperative game
with a trigger strategy. We also consider cases (i) when the products are exported, (ii) when
the firm lobbies for R&D subsidy, and (iii) when the firm is foreign owned. We characterize
situations when government intervention increases the chances of product innovation and
when it does not.
JEL Classification: C71, C72, F10, O31
Key words: product innovation, R&D, matching subsidy.
§ Department of Economics, The University of Tampa, e-mail: pburyi@ut.edu
‡ Department of Economics, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, e-mail: lahiri@siu.edu
Corresponding author: Sajal Lahiri, Department of Economics, Southern Illinois University
Carbondale, Carbondale, IL. 62901, U.S.A., e-mail: lahiri@siu.edu
1 Introduction
Research and Development (R&D) is important not only to firms, but also to the society at large.
However, there are different types of R&D investments. Firms can engage in product R&D, which
attempts to develop new goods, and in process R&D, which attempts cost-reducing innovations
in manufacturing process. Product R&D deserves particular attention because it makes up the
majority of total R&D investment and it is responsible for many breakthroughs that spur economic
growth (Gilbert, 2006). According to the National Science Foundation, in 1981 about 75% of all
industry R&D was product R&D (NSF 2004).
It is believed that a firm’s level of R&D investment often differs from that of social optimum,
and therefore many nations have attempted various policies intended to stimulate private R&D
investment. Cohen and Noll (1995) and Stiglitz and Wallsten (1999) provide survey of the United
States government programs of technology partnerships, and theories supporting them. These
partnerships include public funding of industry R&D projects and private research ventures, as
well as, collaborations between industry and government scientists. The idea is to generate research
that yields commercial products and innovations. Others examine industry specific programs of
R&D.1 Economic justification for these programs is straightforward: although some of the projects
could benefit society they are not being developed due to the low profitability from the firm’s point
of view. By helping the firm, a government could make these projects privately profitable.
The purpose of this paper is to answer the following research questions regarding product
R&D. First is basic question. Should a government help domestic firms to develop product? As we
shall show in some circumstances it is best for the government not to get involved. Can government
support encourage firms to undertake projects that it would not attempt otherwise? We find this
to be the case in some other circumstances. Does repeated interactions between the firm and the
government help innovation which would not be attempted otherwise? Once again we find that the
answer can be yes.
One of the ways that government could help and at the same time encourage firms to innovate
is by issuing a matching grant, where private investments are proportionally matched by public
contributions. There are many state organizations that provide help to product innovating firms
in this manner. For example, Florida High Tech Corridor Council (FHTCC), and Massachusetts
Life Sciences Center (MLSC). Since these organizations were established in the late 1990 as a part
of President Clinton’s economic campaign in 1993. These two organizations have participated in
thousands of research project and cooperated with hundreds of companies in a variety of industries
ranging from Aerospace to renewable energy in attempts to develop new products. Just two of
them have contributed close to a hundred million dollars that have been matched by a couple of
hundred millions of corporate dollars toward product innovation. Overall, their economic impact
is estimated to exceed a few billion dollars. The primary focus of these organizations is to foster
cooperation between national universities and their industry partners. Every year, many companies
use these matching grants to leverage their R&D budgets with academic partnership to develop new
1Cohen and Noll (1995b) study cooperative agreements. Irwin and Klenow (1996) study the effect of
Sematech. Yager and Schmidt (1997) study the Institutions of Advanced Technology Program. Wallsten
(2000) takes a closer look at Small Business Innovation Research Program.
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commercial goods. These organizations match private investments at different levels, ranging from
one public to three private dollars to one-to-one basis. Although these matching grant programs
have become popular, the theoretical literature on this topic is limited.
The broader literature on product innovation considers a number of issues such the role of
buyers’ information on quality (Chiang and Masson, 1988), the role of the nature of competition
(Motta, 1993; De Bondt and Vendekerckhove, 2010; Schmutzler, 2010), and uncertainty about prod-
uct quality (Bagwell and Staiger, 1989). There is also a large empirical and theoretical literature
on the effect of competition within an industry on the product innovation by firms (see, Gilbert,
2006b; Spiegel and Tooks, 2008; Askenazy et al., 2008; Castellacci, 2009; Chen and Schwartz, 2010;
Aghion et al., 1998, 2002, 2005; Belleflamme and Vergari, 2011; Karaman and Lahiri, 2014; Ahmed
and Lahiri, 2014). Some like Aghion et al. consider a patient-race model while other like Grossman
and Helpman (1991) use a quality-ladder model. In contrast, we consider the product-innovating
R&D with uncertain outcome a la Grossman and Helpman (1991) by a monopolist and focus of
the role of the government under different assumptions on the latter’s objective function.
We provide a theoretical framework that can answer our research questions, and analyze
optimal choice of matching subsidy, as well as, optimal level of private investment. We consider
different scenarios depending on whether the private firm and the government act simultaneously,
act sequentially, or take part in a dynamic cooperative game with a trigger strategy. We also
consider cases (i) when the products are exported, (ii) when the firm lobbies for R&D subsidy, and
(iii) when the firm is foreign owned. We compare results across the scenarios. In some of the cases,
we find that whereas the sequential and the simultaneous moves results in the same outcome. We
also find that although the dynamic setting does not lead to an increase in total R&D expenditure,
it can lead to positive efforts on R&D, while in the absence of repeated interactions no R&D
investment would take place. Finally, we find that government support does not always fully crowd
out private investments; sometime it can in fact increase private investment.
The layout of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we first of all set up and analyze the
benchmark model where the firms decides on the the level of R&D investment, and the government
decides on the matching grant, simultaneous. This model is then extended in section 2.1 to allow
the government to pre-commit on the matching subsidy before the firm decides on R&D investment.
In section 3 we consider a repeated game, and in section 4 some concluding remarks are made.
2 Private R&D Innovation with matching support
We consider an economy with two goods: one good that already exist and the other one that
is demanded but has not been developed yet. The goods are imperfect substitutes. Demand and
price for good i are represented by Di and Pi respectively. The utility function of the representative
consumer is:
U = α1D1 + α2D2 − β(D
2
1 +D
2
2) + 2γD1D2
2
+ y, (1)
where the degree of product differentiation is captured by γ which satisfies β > γ > 0, and y is the
consumption of the numeraire good.
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From (1) we can derive the following inverse demand functions:
p1 = α1 − βD1 − γD2 and p2 = α2 − βD2 − γD1, (2)
where αi captures the maximum amount that the consumer is willing to pay for good i.
The producer side of the economy is represented by one monopolistic firm. The firm has
technology to produce good 1, and invests in R&D to develop technology to produce good 2.
The R&D investment level, e. This private R&D investment and a matching share s from the
government determines the probability, q(e(1 + s)), of it being successful in developing a new good.
We consider the following functional form of the probability function:
q(e(1 + s)) =
e(1 + s)
1 + e(1 + s)
. (3)
Expected profit is given by:
E[pi] = q(e(1 + s))pis + (1− q(e(1 + s)))pin (4)
where pis and pin are profits when R&D is successful and when it is not successful respectively.
Once the outcome of R&D becomes known the firm makes output decisions and profit is
realized. If R&D achieves its objective, the firm chooses how much of good 1 and how much of good
2 to produce. However, if R&D fails, then the firm chooses quantity of good 1 whose production
technology has been available prior to R&D. All R&D activities are done by an independent lab, and
to start with we assume that the the R&D investment decision by the firms and the government’s
decision on the matching share s are done simultaneously. That is, the timing of the game is
described as follows.
Stage 1:
• The government chooses matching share
• The firm chooses level of private investment
• R&D is done by an independent lab
Stage 2:
• The firm chooses output
We use backward induction to solve the game. In the last stage of the game, the success of
R&D, as well as expected profit and expected social welfare, are realized.
In the last stage there are two possible outcomes:
pis = (p1s − c1)x1s + (p2s − c2)x2s − e, pin = (p1n − c1)x1n − e, (5)
where pij is price and xij is quantity of good i when the outcome of the R&D j with j = s (success)
or j = n (failure), ci is the constant unit cost of producing good i, and e is cost of the R&D
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investment. Since R&D is done by an independent laboratory, profit under each state of the world
is not directly affected by the matching share that government contributes.
In each of the two cases firm chooses how much of each available good to produce by maxi-
mizing profit. In the case of R&D achieving its objectives, the firm chooses amount of x1s and x2s
by setting ∂E[pi]/∂x1s = 0 and ∂E[pi]/∂x2s = 0. When R&D fails, the firm chooses amount of x1n
by setting ∂E[pi]/∂x1n = 0. The first order conditions for each state of the world are
∂E[pi]/∂x1s = α1 − βx1s − γx2s − c1 − βx1s − γx2s = 0,
∂E[pi]/∂x2s = α2 − βx2s − γx1s − c1 − βx2s − γx1s = 0, (6)
∂E[pi]/∂x1n = α1 − βx1n − c1 − βx1n = 0.
The optimal profits under different outcomes of R&D and the expected profit are given by
pis = βx21s + 2γx1sx2s + βx
2
2s − e, pin = βx21n − e,
E[pi] =
e(1 + s)
e(1 + s) + 1
(βx21s + 2γx1sx2s + βx
2
2s) +
1
e(1 + s) + 1
(βx21n)− e. (7)
Similarly, consumers’ surplus (CS) under different R&D outcomes and the expected con-
sumers’ surplus are
CSs =
(α1 − p1s)x1s
2
+
(α2 − p2s)x2s
2
, CSn =
(α1 − p1n)x1n
2
,
E[CS] =
e(1 + s)
e(1 + s) + 1
CSs +
1
e(1 + s) + 1
CSn. (8)
We now turn to the specification of the government’s objective function. The government
maximizes a linear combination of expected profits, expected consumers’ surplus and subsidy pay-
ments which is paid for by lump-sum taxation of the representative consumer
E[W ] = θ1E[pi] + θ2E[CS]− s ∗ e, (9)
where θ1 and θ2 are two parameters. We shall consider a number of special cases depending on
specific values of these two parameters, and these are:
Case 1: The benchmark case: θ1 = θ2 = 1. Here the government’s objective function coincides with
social welfare.
Case 2: The case of export oriented production: θ1 = 1 and θ2 = 0.
Case 3: The case of lobbying by the producer: θ1 > 1 and θ2 = 1. In this case (9) is best described
as a political support function (see Long and Vousden (1991)). It can also be seen as a reduced
form of campaign contribution model a la Grossman and Helpman (1994).
Case 4: The case of foreign direct investment: θ1 = 0 and θ2 = 1.
Substituting the solutions of the output levels and prices from (2) and (6) into (7) and (8)
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and then those in turn into (9), we get
E[pi] =
e(1 + s)
e(1 + s) + 1
(βx21s + 2γx1sx2s + βx
2
2s) +
1
e(1 + s) + 1
(βx21n)− e (10)
E[W ] =
e(1 + s)
e(1 + s) + 1
(θ1 + 0.5θ2)(βx
2
1s + 2γx1sx2s + βx
2
2s)
+
1
e(1 + s) + 1
(θ1 + 0.5θ2)(βx
2
1n)− e(θ1 + s). (11)
In stage 1 of the game, the firm maximizes (10) with respect to e and the government
maximizes (11) with respect to s, simultaneously, giving the following first-order conditions:
∂E[pi]
∂e
=
(1 + s)(βx21s + 2γx1sx2s + βx
2
2s − βx21n)
(e(1 + s) + 1)2
− 1 = 0, (12)
∂E[W ]
∂s
=
e(θ1 + 0.5θ2)(βx
2
1s + 2γx1sx2s + βx
2
2s − βx21n)
(e(1 + s) + 1)2
− e = 0. (13)
Solving (12) and (13) simultaneously the Nash optimal private investment and optimal
matching share are obtained as
esim =
√
(θ1 + 0.5θ2)(βx21s + 2γx1sx2s + βx
2
2s − βx21n)− 1
θ1 + 0.5θ2
, (14)
ssim = θ1 + 0.5θ2 − 1. (15)
From (15) we see that under case 1 (θ1 = θ2 = 1), ssim = 0.5. That is, the public to private
input ratio in the R&D is 1:2. From (14) it also follows that the firm would invest in product
innovation, i.e., esim > 0, if and only if the following is true
pis − pin > 1
θ1 + 0.5θ2
= Ω (say). (16)
That is, for the firm to have enough incentive to invest the difference in profits between
success and failure has to be sufficiently high. pis − pin > 0 is not enough because of the inherent
risk involved.
When the government does not support R&D, by setting s = 0 in (12) we find that the firm
will invest in R&D if and only if pis − pin > 1. In the case of export-oriented production (case 2),
Ω = 1, the government support makes no difference to the private incentive to invest. In the case
of foreign direct investment (case 4), Ω > 1 and the level of optimal matching subsidy is negative.
In this case the firm is more likely to invest in R&D without any government intervention. In the
other two cases (case 1 and case 3), Ω < 1,and the firm would invest in product innovation for a
wider range of parameter in the presence of government support compared to the range when the
government does not intervene.
Finally, it can be verified that the total amount of R&D expenditure e(1 + s) is larger with
government support than without it if and only if θ1 + 0.5θ2 > 1. This condition is satisfied in
cases 1 and 2, it is not satisfied in case 4, and in case 2 government subsidy is zero and therefore
it is irrelevant.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that the firm decides on the R&D investment and government decides on
the level of matching subsidy simultaneously. Then we have the following.
1. When the government maximizes social welfare (case 1) and when the firm lobbies the gov-
ernment for support (case 3), optimal matching subsidy is positive, and government support
increases the range of parameter values over which the the firm will invest in R&D. Under
case 1, the optimal matching share is 50%,
2. In the case of export-oriented production (case 2), the government does not support R&D
(ssim = 0),
3. In the case of foreign direct investment (case 4), the government taxes R&D, and the firm is
more likely to invest without government intervention, and
4. Total R&D expenditure is higher with government support under cases 1 and 3.
Given the risk of not succeeding in R&D efforts, a firm would not invest in R&D if potential
success does not bring sufficiently large benefit. Clearly, if the government supports such private
efforts with matching subsidy, the cost of downside risk is mitigated somewhat and the firm would
invest in R&D with support when it would not have without the support. However, subsidy is
financed by a tax on the representative consumer and has a welfare cost. When the products are
only for exports, the marginal benefit of a subsidy to the producer cancels with the cost to the
taxpayers, and no intervention is optimal. When the firm is foreign, the benefit to the firm is not
a part of the welfare, and benefit to the consumers’ is outweighed by the cost to the taxpayers and
the optimal policy is to tax R&D efforts.
2.1 Sequential Game
Hitherto we assumed that in stage 1 of the game the firm decides on the R&D investment level and
the government decides on the matching subsidy level simultaneously. In this subsection, we shall
assume that the government pre-commits on the matching subsidy before the firm decides on the
investment level. To be more specific, we assume that the government moves before the firm. In
particular, the timing of the game is given by:
Stage 1:
• The government chooses s that maximize expected social welfare
Stage 2:
• The firm chooses e to maximize expected profit
• An independent lab conducts e(1 + s) amount of R&D activity
Stage 3:
• The firm makes output decisions
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We once again use backward induction to solve the problem. In the third stage of the game
expected profit as well as expected social welfare are determined. Since stage 3 is as before, from
the previous section we know that expected profit is
E[pi] =
e(1 + s)
e(1 + s) + 1
(βx21s + 2γx1sx2s + βx
2
2s) +
1
e(1 + s) + 1
(βx21n)− e. (17)
In the second stage, the firm chooses the amount of private R&D investment, e, that maxi-
mizes expected profit given in (17). The first-order condition is
∂E[pi]
∂e
=
(1 + s)(βx21s + 2γx1sx2s + βx
2
2s − βx21n)
(e(1 + s) + 1)2
− 1 = 0, (18)
From the above first-order conditions we can derive the firm’s reaction function as:
e =
√
(1 + s)(βx21s + 2γx1sx2s + βx
2
2s − βx21n)− 1
1 + s
, (19)
with
de
ds
=
(1 + s)2
1− 0.5√(pis − pin)(1 + s) . (20)
In the first stage of the game, the government chooses s by maximizing the objective function
given by (11), taking into account the firm’s reaction function given above. That is
dE[W ]
ds
=
∂E[W ]
∂s
+
∂E[W ]
∂e
de
ds
= 0, (21)
where
∂E[W ]
∂e
=
(1 + s)(θ1 + 0.5θ2)(pi
s − pin)
(e(1 + s) + 1)2
− (θ1 + s), (22)
and de/ds is given by (20).
We shall now examine how the value of optimal s in this case (sseq) compares with the case
where the firm and the government move simultaneously. We know that
sseq
≥
< ssim ⇐⇒
∂E[W ]
∂s
∣∣∣∣
(e,s)=(esim,ssim)
≥
< 0.
Substituting (14) and (15) in (20) and (22) and then from (21) we get
dE[W ]
ds
∣∣∣∣
(e,s)=(esim,ssim)
=
(
∂E[W ]
∂e
de
ds
)∣∣∣∣
(e,s)=(esim,ssim)
=
1− θ1
(θ1 + 0.5θ2)2
(
1− 0.5
√
(pis − pin)(θ1 + 0.5θ2)
)
. (23)
We shall now examine the sign of the right-hand side of (23) under the four cases considered
in the preceding section. In case 1 (θ1 = θ2 = 1) and in case 2 (θ1 = 1, θ2 = 0), dE[W ]/ds = 0 and
therefore we have sseq = ssim. In case 3 (θ1 > 1, θ2 = 1) we have
dE[W ]
ds
∣∣∣∣
(e,s)=(esim,ssim)
=
1− θ1
(θ1 + 0.5θ2)2
(
1− 0.5
√
(pis − pin)(θ1 + 0.5)
)
,
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and thus
sseq
≥
< ssim ⇐⇒ pis − pin ≥<
8
2θ1 + 1
.
Similarly, in case 4 (θ1 = 0, θ2 = 1), it can be show that
sseq
≥
< ssim ⇐⇒ pis − pin ≤> 8.
The above results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the firm decides on the R&D investment after government decides on
the level of matching subsidy. Then we have the following.
1. When the government maximizes social welfare (case 1: θ1 = θ2 = 1) or when the product is
produced solely for exports (case 2: θ1 = 1, θ2 = 0), we have sseq = ssim.
2. In the case of lobbying by the producer (case 3: θ1 > 1, θ2 = 1), we have
sseq
≥
< ssim ⇐⇒ pis − pin ≥<
8
2θ1 + 1
.
3. In the case of foreign direct investment (case 4: θ1 = 0, θ2 = 1), we have
sseq
≥
< ssim ⇐⇒ pis − pin ≤> 8.
When the matching subsidy is at the Nash optimal level, i.e., s = ssim, and θ1 = 1, equations
(10) and (11) are the same but for a multiplicative term. Thus, the investment level e that
maximizes private profits also maximizes social welfare, i..e., (∂E[W ]/∂e)|s=ssim = 0. This happens
for a number of reasons. First, output levels under different states of the world do not depend on
the level of investment because of the time structure of the game. Second, e and 1+s always appear
together in a multiplicative form e(1 + s). Finally, when θ1 = 1, the private cost of investment
to the firm e and the taxpayer’s cost of subsidizing R&D have the same weight in the welfare
function. In this case, by pre-committing itself on matching subsidy, the government cannot alter
the equilibrium. When θ1 > 1, (∂E[W ]/∂e)|s=ssim < 0, and thus sseq > ssim if the firm’s reaction
function is downward sloping, which puts a lower bound on pis − pin. Similarly, the rest of the
results can be explained.
3 Cooperative Dynamic Game
In the previous section we have seen that by committing itself to a matching share before the firm
decides on the R&D investment, a government cannot increase the range of parameters over which
R&D investments would take place when θ1 = 1, i.e., when the the government maximizes social
welfare or the firm does not lobby (proposition 2). In this section we explore the possibility of the
firm and government achieving greater efficiency by choosing values of private R&D investment
and matching share through cooperation, which are different from the Nash equilibrium and that
are self-enforcing when θ1 = 1. For this, we consider a stationary dynamic matching R&D game,
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a similar to one used by Bagwell and Staiger(1997) in a different context, which is defined by the
infinite repetition of the static matching game described above. Typically, R&D partnerships do
not end on one project, and the matching game repeats over and over again.
In each period, the firm and the government observe all previous selections of private invest-
ments and matching shares and then simultaneously choose the level of private investment and the
matching share respectively. The game is stationary in the sense that none of the parameters of
the model change over time. We focus on a particular class of subgame perfect equilibria for the
stationary dynamic matching game. Specifically, we consider equilibria in which (i) firm and gov-
ernment select feasible and stationary values of private investment and matching share respectively
along their equilibrium paths, meaning that in equilibrium each party chooses the same value in
each period, and (ii) if a deviation from these equilibrium values occur, then in the next period and
forever thereafter players revert to the Nash equilibrium values of private investment and matching
share of the static matching game. The latter is the punishment or trigger strategy employed by
each. We shall refer to the subgame perfect equilibrium which yields the highest possible values
of the expected profit and expected social welfare while satisfying restrictions (i) and (ii) as the
most-cooperative equilibrium of the stationary dynamic matching game. The corresponding pri-
vate investment and matching share are then termed the most-cooperative values for the stationary
dynamic matching game.
It is possible to support a cooperative solution that is mutually beneficial, since any attempt
to deviate from the current period values of private investment or matching share will be greeted
with retaliatory (Nash) values of private investment and matching share respectively in future
periods. Therefore, a cooperative private investment and a cooperative matching share can be
supported in equilibrium for the stationary dynamic matching game if one time incentive to cheat
is sufficiently small relative to the discounted future value of maintaining a cooperative relationship
between firm and government.
Let us first examine the incentives for the firm to cheat or not. For a fixed cooperative
matching share and level of private investment given the class of the subgame-perfect equilibria
upon which we focus, if the firm is to deviate and choose a e which is different from the cooperative
equilibrium value eco, then it will deviate to its best-response simultaneous Nash level of private
investment, esim. Thus the gain from cheating is given by
Ωf (eco, sco) ≡ E[pi(esim, sco)]− E[pi(eco, sco)].
When the firm cheats, its future expected profit s, and the cost of cheating can be computed
as follows. The following expression defines the one-period value of cooperation:
ωf (eco, sco) ≡ E[pi(eco, sco)]− E[pi(esim, ssim)]
Then the cost of cheating to the firm is ωf (eco, sco)δ/(1 − δ)) since once the firm defects and
chooses the level of private investment different to the cooperative value, cooperative matching
share is thereafter replaced by the Nash matching share. Hence, cooperative condition, or know as
“no-defect” condition is that the benefit of cheating has to be less than the discounted future value
of cooperation, or:
Ωf (eco, sco) ≤ δ
1− δωf (eco, sco),
9
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the time discount factor, i.e., it is 1/(1 + r) where r is the discount rate.
We now turn to the incentives of the government to cheat not. For a fixed cooperative private
investment, matching share, and the class of subgame-perfect equilibria upon which we focus, if
government deviates and selects s 6= sco, then it will deviate to its best-response Nash matching
share, ssim. Thus, the gain from cheating for the government is given by:
Ωg(eco, sco) ≡ E[W (eco, ssim)]− E[W (eco, sco)]
When government cheats, however, it also causes future welfare to drop, and one-period cost
of cheating is equal to:
ωg(eco, sco) ≡ E[W (eco, sco)]− E[W (esim, ssim)]
Similarly to the firm, government would choose to cooperate if one time incentive to cheat is
less than the discounted value of the future cooperation. Government’s cooperative or “no-defect”
condition can be written as:
Ωg(eco, sco) ≤ δ
1− δωg(eco, sco)
Any cooperative private investment and matching share that satisfy both firms and govern-
ments no-defect conditions can be supported in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the stationary
dynamic matching R&D game.
When θ1 = 1 (an assumption that we are making here), a special feature of the model is
that in the simultaneous game the government achieves the level of the total R&D investment that
maximizes expected social welfare even without cooperation. We can check this by maximizing
expected social welfare with respect to total investment, by setting ∂E[W ]/∂e(1 + s) = 0. First
order condition of this maximization problem is:
∂E[W ]
∂(e(1 + s))
=
(1 + 0.5θ)(pis − pin)
(e(1 + s))2
− 1 = 0.
Solving the first order condition for e(1+s) reveals that optimal amount of R&D investment,
from government’s point of view, is equal to the Nash total investment, i.e.,
[e(1 + s)]soc =
√
(1 + 0.5θ2)(pis − pin)− 1
Therefore, E[W (esim, ssim)] is the maximum value of the social welfare.
2 It means that social
welfare cannot be increased by cooperation. However, if the total amount of R&D investment in
cooperative equilibrium is equal to that of the non-cooperative game then the government would
2From second order condition we know that Nash investment is a global maximum, because
∂2E[W ]
∂e(1 + s)∂e(1 + s)
= −2(1 + 0.5θ)(pi
s − pin)
(e(1 + s))3
< 0. (24)
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be indifferent whether to cooperate or not. Hence, the government cooperation condition for
simultaneous cooperative game can be rewritten as:
eco(sco + 1) = esim(ssim + 1).
The firm’s gain from cheating and value of cooperation can be calculated as
Ωf (eco, sco) =
esim(esim(ssim + 1) + 1)(sco − sN )
(1 + ssim)(esim(sco + 1) + 1)
− (esim − eco)
ωf (eco, sco) = (esim − eco).
Thus, cooperative equilibrium exists when the following system holds:
eco(sco + 1) = esim(ssim + 1)
esim(esim(ssim + 1) + 1)(sco − sN )
(1 + ssim)(esim(sco + 1) + 1)
≤ 1
1− δ (eN − eco).
It is easy to check that the second of the above condition will be satisfied with equality. Solving
the system yields the following solutions
eco = esim(1− δ(esim(ssim + 1) + 1)), sco = ssim + δ(esim(ssim + 1) + 1)
1− δ(esim(ssim + 1) + 1) .
Three points to note from the above solution. First, as long as esim > 0, both eco and sco
are strictly positive if and only if the following restriction on the value of δ is satisfied:
δ <
1
esim(ssim + 1) + 1)
=
1√
(pis − pin)(1 + 0.5θ2)
,
Second, under the same restriction on δ, eco < esim and seco > ssim. Finally, as we have seen
before, esim > 0 if and only if
pis − pin > 1
1 + 0.5θ2
.
Therefore, R&D investment would take place under cooperative if pis − pin fall in the range,
1
1 + 0.5θ2
< pis − pin < 1
(1 + 0.5θ2)δ2
. (25)
To summarize, if the parameters are in the range described in (25), the government will
be indifferent between a cooperative and non-cooperative game, but the firm will prefer the co-
operative game as it will spend less on R&D and the government will pay more subsidy. Total
R&D expenditure will remain the same. Thus in this range the cooperative solution will prevail. If
1/(1 + 0.5θ2) > pi
s−pin, there will be no R&D investment at all, and if pis−pin > 1/((1 + 0.5θ2)δ2),
there will be no cooperation and the non-cooperative equilibrium will prevail. Interestingly, if
the goods are produced solely for exports, i.e., if θ2 = 0, the government would not provide any
matching subsidy (see proposition 1(2)). Thus, the existence of cooperation simply enhances the
possibility of public support for product R&D for export-oriented firms. Also, the less patient the
firm is (small δ), the larger is the matching share that government chooses, and the more likely
that a cooperative equilibrium would prevail. These results are stated in the following proposition.
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Proposition 3 Suppose that the firm is domestically owned and it does not lobby the government
for subsidy (θ1 = 1). Then a cooperative equilibrium will prevail if the parameters are in the range
described in (25). The less patient the firm is, the larger is the matching share that government
chooses, and the more likely that a cooperative equilibrium would prevail.
4 Conclusion
This paper is first to develop a theoretical model of product R&D by a monopolist and a matching
grant by the government. The relationship between the two parties is modeled in a game theoretic
framework and three frameworks are considered and compared. In the first, the firm decides on the
R&D investment level and the government determines the matching R&D subsidy simultaneously.
In the second framework, they move sequentially: the government moves earlier than the firm.
Finally, the third framework considers a repeated game between the two parties. We characterize
the equilibrium in each of the three frameworks.
We consider four scenarios regarding the government’s objective function: (i) it is the social
welfare function, (ii) no consumers’ surplus because the goods are exported, (iii) it is a political
support function where the monopolist lobby the government for subsidy, and (iv) the monopolist
firm is foreign owned. Some of our key findings are as follows. We find that under (i) and (ii)
the simultaneous game and the sequential game leads to identical outcome. Moreover, under (ii)
the government does not provide any matching subsidy. This non-participation by the government
will not hold when a cooperative repeated game prevails over a non-cooperative one. We derive
restrictions on the parameter space for a cooperative equilibrium to prevail.
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